


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
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**C VIETNAM:** Fighting continues in and around Quang Tri City following stiffened Communist resistance.

South Vietnamese airborne troops reportedly encountered strong opposition when they attacked enemy defenses in the western section of the city on 9 July. The day before, airborne troops located along the city's southern outskirts as well as other units farther to the south had been subjected to Communist mortar and artillery fire. Lead elements of the South Vietnamese Marines have advanced to a point about one mile east of the city, but their progress has been slowed by artillery barrages and harassing ground attacks.

The Communists are also keeping up the pressure around Hue. Fire Support Base Bastogne west of the city has been shelled heavily and several government troop concentrations in the vicinity have been subjected to ground attacks. Hue and several military positions to the south were shelled over the weekend, but casualties and damage were minimal.

Military activity in the rest of the country was relatively light except in the northern Mekong Delta where Communist forces are pressing their attacks around Base Area 470 in western Dinh Tuong Province. Two nearby district towns have received mortar and ground attacks and several surrounding military outposts have been overrun or abandoned. These Communist attacks appear to be designed to secure the base area and the nearby canal network.

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
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CAMBODIA: The Cambodian - South Vietnamese operation to regain control over a section of Route 1 is making slow progress.

Heavy rains have been hindering the advance of Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops toward their initial objective, the enemy-held town of Kompong Trabek in Prey Veng Province. The poor weather has also been hampering close air support. The main Cambodian contingent was some two miles west of Kompong Trabek on 9 July, while the bulk of the South Vietnamese forces was a few miles south of the town. The operation thus far has encountered only limited Communist resistance, and casualties on both sides have been light. If Kompong Trabek is retaken, the Cambodians reportedly plan to continue moving eastward along Route 1 toward Svay Rieng City.

South of Phnom Penh, Communist forces in Takeo Province are keeping the pressure on Angtassom on Route 3. A five-battalion government relief column from Takeo City that has been trying to reach Angtassom is still meeting strong enemy opposition on the eastern edge of the embattled town. As the fighting around Angtassom enters its second week, over-all government casualties stand at 27 killed and 126 wounded. If the Communists remain in the Angtassom area, they will be in a position to control a sizable stretch of Route 3 running through Takeo and Kampot provinces. [redacted]

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**[ ] BURMA:** The Burmese Government and the Kachin rebels have declared a truce in order to cope with mounting pressure from Communist insurgents in northeast Burma.

25X1      Military operations between the government and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) halted on 20 June, [ ] and as of 2 July, both sides were still respecting the cease-fire.

The Kachins, one of several ethnic minority groups in Burma, for years have fought for an autonomous state within a federated Union of Burma. In their anti-government effort, KIA elements from time to time have accepted small amounts of arms from China and have collaborated with Burmese Communist insurgents. At other times, the KIA has conducted operations against both the Communists and the government. Early this year, a non-aggression pact between the KIA and the Communists collapsed, and the Kachins began overtures to the government. By February, active fighting between the KIA and the Communists had begun, and in April the Communists resumed pressure on government military positions.

The government was quick to respond to Kachin approaches, and is now engaged in talks with the rebels on coordinated action against the Communists. The government-Kachin truce is unlikely to endure because neither party is prepared to abandon its conflicting objectives. Short-lived cooperation may well be achieved, however, and could be of some assistance to the government. [ ]

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**CYPRUS:** At the first substantive session of the resumed intercommunal talks on 4 July, Turkish Cypriot representative Denktash made a tough, unyielding statement. While it contained a strong element of theatrics to impress the other participants with Turkish Cypriot resolve, Denktash's statement, nonetheless, underscores the wide gap between the two communities.

Denktash insisted that he will not be bound in the new talks by previous understandings with the Greek Cypriot representative. He asserted that the Turkish Cypriots will not accept piecemeal implementation of agreements reached on individual issues but insist on an over-all settlement. In a speech to a Turkish Cypriot audience on 5 July, Denktash stated that any solution must conform with existing realities, one of which is the Turkish Cypriot community's separate status. The Greek Cypriots favor solving the various problems on an ad hoc basis and have always opposed any Turkish Cypriot autonomy.

In these circumstances, hope that the talks will resolve the long-standing differences between the two communities remains dim. Nevertheless, the participants have agreed to meet twice a week in an attempt to find some common ground for agreement. Given Greek and Turkish interest in the continuation of the talks, they are likely to go on for some time, despite the slim chance for success.

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